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Abstract 
Simplifying access to and usage of large 
scale compute resources via the Grid is of 
critical importance to encourage the uptake of 
e-Research. Security is one aspect that needs to 
be made as simple as possible for end users. 
The ESP-Grid and DyVOSE projects at the 
National e-Science Centre (NeSC) at the 
University of Glasgow are investigating 
security technologies which will make the end-
user experience of using the Grid easier and 
more secure. In this paper we outline how 
simplified (from the user experience) 
authentication and authorization of users are 
achieved through single usernames and 
passwords at users’ home institutions. This 
infrastructure, which will be applied in the 
second year of the Grid Computing module 
part of the advanced MSc in Computing 
Science at the University of Glasgow, combines 
Grid portal technology, the Internet2 
Shibboleth Federated Access Control 
infrastructure, and the PERMIS Role-Based 
Access Control technology. Through this 
infrastructure inter-institutional teaching can 
be supported where secure access to federated 
resources is made possible between sites. A key 
aspect of the work we describe here is the 
ability to support dynamic delegation of 
authority whereby local/remote administrators 
are able to dynamically assign meaningful 
privileges to remote/local users respectively in 
a trusted manner thus allowing for the dynamic 
establishment of virtual organizations with fine 
grained security at their heart. 
1.   Introduction 
One of the key factors crucial to the success 
of the UK e-Science programme, and Grid 
computing in general, is to provide an 
infrastructure that is easy to use. The uptake of 
large scale resources such as the National Grid 
Service (NGS) in the UK [1] is proving to be 
heavily dependent on how easily users can run 
their jobs, and on how much extra infrastructure 
is required to be implemented by them to 
integrate their applications with the Grid. 
Currently the end-user experience of submitting 
a job to a resource such as the NGS starts with 
the acquisition of a UK e-Science X.509 
Certificate issued by the UK e-Science 
Certificate Authority (CA) [2] which is based at 
Rutherford Appleton Laboratory (RAL) in 
Oxfordshire, UK. This is a process which 
involves contacting a central certification 
authority which issues certificates binding a 
user’s identity to the public key contained in the 
issued X.509 certificate. Currently the user is 
expected to initially request a certificate directly 
from the CA web interface, which will 
subsequently send the request to a locally 
delegated Regional (or Registration) Authority 
(RA) which will normally be a responsible and 
recognised individual within the user’s 
organisation, but may be at a remote institution 
if the user’s home institution has no registered 
RA. The user is required to meet the RA in 
person to confirm the certificate request, and 
provide a form of standard identification 
(driving licence, passport, staff card) to confirm 
their identity. Once their identity is established, 
the RA approves the certificate request, and the 
central CA is contacted again to issue the 
certificate.  
This process may take several days, 
especially if the user has no RA close by. Also, 
the issuing of nationally recognised digital 
certificates carries with it certain protocols and 
best practises which must be adhered to if the 
integrity of the CA is to be trusted. This 
involves measures such as strong password 
encryption of the private key, appropriate 
backup of issued certificates, and the conversion 
of certificates to appropriate formats. The extra 
work involved in not only acquiring the 
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certificate, but also the time taken for the users 
to familiarise themselves with the technology of 
Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) make this an 
undesirable course of action for bringing the 
Grid to users.  
A key issue facing the wider less-IT 
focused research community is also the 
requirement for them to convert the certificate 
to appropriate formats understandable by Grid 
(Globus) middleware, e.g. through running 
commands such as: $> openssl pkcs12 -in cert.p12 
-clcerts -nokeys -out usercert.pem 
Such requirements are likely to dissuade 
less IT-savvy researchers from engaging – 
especially as openSSL is not commonly 
available on platforms such as Windows. We 
note that the UK Certification Authority now 
suggests for researchers with Windows based 
PCs that they can use a Windows OpenSSL 
based solution [3], but this in turn requires them 
to install and configure additional software etc. 
In some circumstances this is not possible, for 
example if they do not have sufficient privileges 
on their PC (root access etc) – a not uncommon 
practice in certain departments and faculties at 
Glasgow University for example. In this case 
the researchers will instead have to refer to a 
local system administrator to help with the 
installation and configuration.  
Assuming researchers have managed to 
obtain a certificate which they have converted 
into the appropriate format, they are then 
expected to remember strong 16-character 
passwords for their private keys with the 
recommendation to use upper and lower case 
alphanumeric characters. The temptation to 
write down such passwords is apparent and an 
immediate and obvious potential security 
weakness. Alternative, judgement based 
personalised authentication schemes drawing 
upon user knowledge bases are one way in 
which such issues can be resolved but as yet 
still largely a research area [4,5]. 
This process as a whole does not lend itself 
to the wider research community which the e-
Science and Grid community needs to reach out 
to and engage with. It is a well known adage 
that the customer is always right. Usability and 
addressing researcher requirements is crucial to 
the uptake and success of Grid technology. End 
user scientists require software which simplifies 
their daily research and not make this more 
complex. Given the fact that the initial user 
experience of the Grid currently begins with 
application for UK e-Science certificates, this 
needs to be made as simple as possible, or 
potentially removed completely.  
Indeed it is our experience in the UK e-
Science initiative and a multitude of associated 
projects that this “enabling” technology is 
forcing people to abandon the Grid in favour of 
their more familiar, decentralised applications. 
This situation need not be the case 
however. Security technologies exist that can 
both strengthen Grid security to include 
authorisation and not just authentication, and 
tailor the security environment to be familiar to 
end users, e.g. based on their local institutional 
usernames and passwords. 
2.   Technologies 
2.1  Shibboleth 
Shibboleth [6] is an Internet2 project 
designed to implement an open, standards-based 
protocol for securely transferring user attributes 
between collaborating sites. It is currently being 
deployed in the UK academic community as an 
inter-institutional infrastructure to support 
existing local methods of user authentication. 
The core of Shibboleth is an implicit trust 
relationship between institutions within a 
federation. A federation is a collection of 
institutions which trust each other to 
authenticate their users properly, and is 
responsible for distributing the PKI components 
necessary to establish trust between relying 
parties. Grid authentication currently relies on 
the nationally centralised CA described above to 
confirm the identity of individuals, whereas 
Shibboleth delegates the responsibility of 
authenticating users to where they belong: the 
user’s home institution. Educational institutions 
in particular have reliable and established 
methods of authenticating their students and 
staff, usually by the process of matriculation for 
students, or human resources registration for 
staff members. Institution IT facilities are 
usually available everywhere across campus, 
accessible by usernames and passwords that the 
student will use irrespective of location. Ideally 
there should be a single username/password but 
often a variety of solutions exist depending 
upon the technologies. We note that Glasgow 
University is in the process of rolling out a 
unified account management system where all 
accounts and associated services are centrally 
managed using active directory technology [7]. 
 Shibboleth extends local authentication 
and authorisation to allow institutions within a 
federation to trust local infrastructures 
sufficiently to allow access to large-scale 
resources utilising local login information 
without the need for a centralised authentication 
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mechanism. Therefore, a student would login to 
a resource such as the National Grid Service 
using their local institution login, and through 
the federated trust model of Shibboleth, this 
authentication information is valid across the 
Grid (assuming that the NGS is in a federation 
with the students institution).  
The architecture of Shibboleth defines 
several entities which are necessary to achieve 
this seamless integration of separate 
collaborating institutional logins. The main 
components of Shibboleth consist of an Identity 
Provider (also known as a Shibboleth ‘Origin’), 
a Where-Are-You-From (WAYF) service, and a 
Service Provider (also known as a Shibboleth 
‘Target’).  
The role of each of these entities is best 
described by an example invocation of a service 
that is protected by Shibboleth. A user types in 
the URL of the service (or portal) they wish to 
access. We assume that the web server that 
hosts the service is protected by Shibboleth and 
is known as the Target. Any attempts to access 
this page will cause the Shibboleth web server 
plug-in to start and to instantly redirect the user 
to the WAYF service. The WAYF service is 
generally run by the federation that the 
institution is subscribed to, but can also be run 
locally. The WAYF service presents a drop-
down list to the user that contains all the 
participating institutions (or projects) that are 
subscribed to within the federation. The user 
chooses their home institution from this list and 
is then redirected to the home institution’s 
Origin. This is a specific Shibboleth resource 
based at the user’s home institution that 
integrates Shibboleth with the existing local 
login mechanism. The Origin will provide an 
interface for the user to login as if they were at 
their home institution. If successful, the Origin 
passes the user back to the original Target they 
were trying to access, at which point the 
resource can decide whether or not to grant 
access based on the information passed to it by 
the user’s home institution Origin. It is 
important to note that much of this is 
transparent to the end users: they attempt to 
access a Target, are redirected to where a 
WAYF where they select where they are from, 
and subsequently log-in to their local institution. 
The authentication information and any security 
attributes that are needed and/or allowed to be 
released occur transparently to the user. They 
are either authorised to access the Target (in 
which case the service is displayed to them) or 
they are unauthorised (in which case they will 
get an appropriate not-authorised 404 exception 
raised). 
Shibboleth itself is deployed as a plug-in to 
Apache web server and is instantiated when a 
user attempts an HTTP request on a Shibboleth-
protected directory. Assertions are exchanged 
between the Origin and Target using SAML 
v1.1 [9], which allows for secure transmission 
of authentication tokens and user attributes 
across the federation. Shibboleth allows for any 
authentication mechanism that can be interfaced 
with Apache, in our case we query a separate 
LDAP directory containing user login 
information and attributes using the 
mod_auth_ldap Apache module, although 
authentication methods such as .htaccess, or 
Kerberos may be implemented. 
2.2    PERMIS 
The PERMIS (Privilege and Role 
Management Infrastructure Standards 
Validation) [10] software realises a Role Based 
Access Control (RBAC) [11] authorisation 
infrastructure implemented in a Java API. It 
offers a scalable alternative to centrally 
allocated PKI certificates through the issuance 
of locally generated X.509 Attribute Certificates 
(ACs).   PERMIS allows institutions to 
implement a Privilege Management 
Infrastructure (PMI), which enforces access 
control on resources based not only on a user’s 
identity, but on specific privileges or roles that 
they have been allocated. Access control in 
most current Grid systems predominantly make 
use of the GSI [12] gridmap file, which is a list 
of all valid users on the system and their 
appropriate user accounts. Although simple to 
use, the Access Control List (ACL) approach of 
GSI faces scalability issues to administer and 
manage when the number of grid users scales up 
to hundreds or thousands. RBAC systems 
instead allocate roles to users based on their 
function within their institution (e.g. Lecturer, 
Student, Administrator). The identity of system 
users will change as new people are employed, 
and older employees leave, however the roles 
and subsequent privileges that these people hold 
will generally remain unchanged. So access 
control policies or lists do not need to be 
constantly updated according to changes in 
personnel, rather, users are assigned these pre-
existing roles so they can be instantly absorbed 
into the PMI with no changes to the system 
itself. 
The PERMIS system uses XML policies 
which define the rules by which a resource will 
grant its users access to its services. A PERMIS 
policy contains the following definitions: 
• Subjects that may be assigned roles 
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• Sources of Authority (the local 
managers trusted to assign roles) 
• The roles themselves and their 
hierarchy 
• The resource targets and the allowed 
actions 
• The actions each role is authorised to 
take 
Roles are assigned to users by issuing them 
with X.509 ACs. The roles are allocated by a 
Privilege Allocator (now called Attribute 
Certificate Manager) tool which binds the role 
to the user, digitally signs the certificate and 
stores it in an LDAP repository.  
The PERMIS API can be applied to any 
application, and through the SAML AuthZ API 
callout [13], can be used to provide a generic 
mechanism for linkage of Grid services and 
authorisation infrastructures. Currently versions 
of the Globus Toolkit since version 3.3 have 
supported this API. This API also allows 
bypassing of the relatively coarse-grained 
authorisation control of GSI. 
A new tool for the final phase of the 
DyVOSE Project provides dynamic delegation 
of authority. This tool and its use in the project 
are described in detail in Section 4. 
2.3    Grid Portals 
In the same way a Web portal such as 
Yahoo or MSN aggregates site information, 
web pages, and indexes, a Grid portal provides a 
framework for providing single-point access to 
Grid services. A portal is a web application that 
runs in a Tomcat container, and a portlet is an 
application, e.g. a Grid service that is accessible 
within the portal. The JSR-168 specification 
[14] provides a framework and associated APIs 
through which portlets can be developed and 
successfully deployed across a variety of 
different portal technologies, and is exploited in 
our work.  
A typical scenario is that the user 
navigates to the portal page, and then, based on 
their identity and the authorisation policies in 
place, the portal displays the relevant portlets 
that the user may interact with. In this way, a 
virtual organisation may be formed by 
aggregating required, separate Grid Services 
into one front-end web page.  
Entry to a portal is generally provided by 
username and password. In the case of a Grid 
portal, this username/password information will 
be used to establish the user’s identity and 
generate a proxy certificate for subsequent Grid 
job submission. It is therefore necessary for the 
portal to carry an Access Control List of its 
valid users. This presents problems similar to 
that which RBAC systems are meant to solve 
(i.e. scalability issues). 
Several Grid Portal solutions are available. 
IBM’s WebSphere [15] is a highly robust 
solution, however it makes use of proprietary 
software that is difficult to interface with newer 
applications. GridLab’s GridSphere software 
[16] is an open source solution that can run out 
of a Tomcat container providing a portal that 
can be altered to interface with our own Grid 
based applications.  
Numerous other portal technologies such as 
PURSE and GAMA are currently being 
explored at the NeSC. [18,19] 
3.   Background Projects 
The JISC funded ESP-Grid project is 
investigating the extent to which Shibboleth can 
offer solutions to the unresolved issues 
regarding Grid security. The National e-Science 
Centre in Glasgow has the remit to build a 
demonstrator showing how Shibboleth can be 
used for secure access to Grid resources.  
The Dynamic Virtual Organisations in e-
Science Education (DyVOSE) [19] is a two-
year JISC funded Core Middleware Program 
project which aims to investigate the use of 
advanced security infrastructures in the e-
Science education domain. As part of the 
project deliverables, an Advanced MSc. Course 
Module in Grid Computing was written and 
delivered at the Department of Computing 
Science in the University of Glasgow at the 
beginning of the 2004/05 session. This course is 
also running again in early 2006, with expanded 
lab work.  
In the previous teaching of the module, a 
thorough exploration was made of the PERMIS 
authorisation software for forming a static PMI 
in a grid infrastructure. Specifically, the 
students were asked to implement a GT3.3 Grid 
service which searched and sorted a text file 
(the complete works of Shakespeare) by 
submitting jobs to our local Condor pool. Once 
deployed, they were required to protect the 
service using PERMIS by implementing the 
correct callouts from GT3, and authoring a 
security policy in XML which would enforce 
access control to certain members of the class. 
In this case, two teams of students were created, 
with the goal of allowing all users to search the 
file, but allowing only users in the student’s 
own team to sort it. Experiences in running the 
course, and knowledge gained from using the 
software was reported at CLAG 2005 in Cardiff 
[20].  
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The final phase of DyVOSE involves 
implementing simple dynamic delegation of 
authority. This involves creating an 
infrastructure together with the e-Science MSc 
course being run at the University of Edinburgh, 
using an extended version of the PERMIS 
software incorporating a Delegation Issuing 
Service (DIS).  
In the rest of this paper we outline how we 
have exploited Shibboleth, PERMIS, Globus 
and GridSphere technologies to provide 
decentralised security, and outline our plans for 
exploiting the dynamic delegation of authority 
capabilities implemented in PERMIS in the 
upcoming Grid Computing module.  
4.   The Delegation Issuing Service 
(DIS) and Dynamic Delegation 
Figure 1: Diagram illustrating Simple 
Dynamic Delegation. Glasgow has 
issued a Role Allocation Policy to 
Edinburgh, allowing it to issue Glasgow 
roles (in ACs) to Edinburgh students 
(and vice versa). 
The DIS (Delegation Issuing Service) [21] 
is a web service that can issue attribute 
certificates on behalf of the logged-in privilege 
holder (normally the Source of Authority 
(SoA)). The DIS service in this case is a Java 
component hosted in a Tomcat container 
running Axis SOAP server. In this case, the 
client is a trusted server acting as a proxy 
between DIS users and the DIS server itself. 
DIS extracts and writes the ACs to a dedicated 
LDAP server. In the static PMI model, any 
entity that issues roles or privileges to users 
must have a PKI key pair. This restriction 
implies that the SoA is responsible for all 
privilege allocations within the VO. In the 
Simple Dynamic Delegation case, the SoA has 
the ability not only to issue roles, but to delegate 
the right to issue roles to its subordinate entities. 
These entities are not required to hold a PKI key 
pair in order to issue ACs to their subordinates 
however the SoA will by definition restrict the 
roles that its subordinate authority will be able 
to issue. This is known as issuing a Role 
Allocation Policy (RAP) to the subordinate. The 
RAP enforces the "top-down" security 
architecture so that subordinate authorities will 
always have lower privilege than their 
superiors. Using the fact that multiple SoAs 
may be trusted in the local security policy in the 
static PMI case, we can extend this idea of 
Dynamic Delegation using the DIS across 
institutional boundaries. This is illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
A static PMI has been implemented at 
the University of Glasgow as part of the first 
year of the Grid Computing module. It consists 
of a SoA which has the job of issuing ACs to 
Glasgow users. The SoA holds an X.509 
certificate which is the root of trust for the 
Glasgow PMI and it is this certificate that signs 
subordinate ACs. The SoA by definition can 
assign any role to any user, but within the 
context of the Glasgow PMI has two roles 
available: studentteam1 and studentteam2. The 
PMI is protecting a Grid Service which grants 
access to users holding one of these roles, and 
denies access to the users holding the other role. 
Any role other than these two will not be 
accepted by the local XML policy and therefore 
no access will be granted. As a final check, the 
role must have been issued and signed by a SoA 
trusted in the XML policy which for a static 
PMI is simply the local SoA.  
As part of the second year of the Grid 
Computing module, the Grid Service was 
extended to grant access to a set of users at the 
University of Edinburgh, which is running its 
own PMI. The simplest approach in this case is 
to include the Edinburgh SoA in the trusted SoA 
policy statement, and tell the Edinburgh SoA 
that it may issue either studentteam1 or 
studentteam2 to its users. Edinburgh users 
wishing to use the Glasgow resource would then 
present their studentteam role when attempting 
access, the Glasgow PMI would see that this 
role was signed by the Edinburgh SoA and 
access would be granted as this SoA appears in 
the trusted SoA list of the XML policy. This 
approach is undesirable as the Glasgow PMI is, 
in effect, allowing an Edinburgh student to act 
as a Glasgow student and inherit all of the 
Glasgow user's privileges. The fundamental 
point to be made here is that it should never be 
the case that an external user should have the 
same rights (role) as a local user. This would 
undermine the local security policy and the 
integrity of the PMI.  
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Another approach is to use Dynamic 
Delegation. In this case a third role would be 
defined alongside the studentteam roles. In the 
static PMI model, this could be achieved by 
adding the Edinburgh SoA to the policy trust 
list, and adding an Edinburgh role to the policy 
using whatever name they have chosen, e.g. 
"EdStudent". This again is an undesirable 
situation as we are now hard-wiring roles from 
another institution into our local security policy.  
A more secure way is to define a 
Glasgow role that exists for non-Glasgow users. 
We simply called this role "external", and it is 
defined in the XML policy as being subordinate 
to the studentteam roles. This role is to be 
granted to users from Edinburgh (or anywhere 
else in the VO) who wish to use the Glasgow 
resource. Through the hierarchy of the XML 
role policy, any privileges that the external role 
holds will be inherited by the studentteam roles, 
yet the studentteam roles will have higher 
privileges which "external" cannot inherit. This 
hierarchy allows distinct levels of trust to be 
implemented based on a user's function and 
location within the VO without surrendering 
local policy integrity. Edinburgh is now free to 
assign this role of external to any of its users 
who wish to access the Glasgow resource. 
Although this sounds better than the previous 
model, there is still the issue that we are freely 
allowing an external (albeit, trusted) entity to 
allocate a Glasgow role to its users. Obviously 
we would like to retain more control over the 
issuing of this role by external institutions. This 
is the job of the Delegation Issuing Service, the 
GUI for which is shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: The Delegation Issuing Service 
(DIS) user interface. 
The DIS allows us to realise a Simple 
Dynamic Delegation infrastructure by providing 
a framework within which a home PMI may 
securely delegate some of its administration to 
external entities. Considering our 
implementation above, the Glasgow PMI has 
defined a subordinate external role in its policy 
and has added the Edinburgh SoA as a trusted 
authority. The Glasgow SoA creates an empty 
Edinburgh Admin entry in their LDAP server 
then logs in to the DIS service as its "root" user. 
The Glasgow SoA issues an X.509 AC 
(effectively a RAP) to the local Edinburgh 
Administrator entry stating that they have been 
delegated the authority to grant the "external" 
role to any of their users. The Edinburgh 
Administrator user (the Edinburgh SoA) can 
now log in to the DIS server where they will be 
allowed to issue ACs containing the external 
role, but no other privileges, to Edinburgh users. 
These ACs will be valid for access to Glasgow 
resources as they have been created through the 
constraints of delegation and the Edinburgh 
SoA is trusted in the XML policy. There have 
been resources set aside in Edinburgh to enable 
"two-way" delegation through an identical setup 
in Edinburgh, with Glasgow students being 
assigned the "external" role.  
Note that in the current software 
implementation, it is necessary for these 
Edinburgh ACs to be held in the Glasgow 
LDAP server. This limitation is being addressed 
by the next version of the PERMIS software. 
The subset of users that the RAP applies to may 
also be constrained by a Target Access Policy 
(TAP) which states further constraints on the 
privileges delegated down to subordinates. This 
software should be available in mid-2006 [22].  
As far as the student end experience goes, 
the search/sort Grid Service will be identical to 
the static PMI version. All the changes are done 
at the administrator level however the students 
will have to include the definition of the 
function of the "external" role in their XML 
policy. This is, as of now, not finalised, 
however the external role could be offered a 
restricted number of invocations of the Grid 
service or some similar constraint. 
5. Implementation Issues 
To explore the integration of Shibboleth 
and associated Grid security technologies, we 
have initially focused upon the Shibboleth 
enabling of the previous Grid Computing 
students project assignment. The software 
infrastructure to realise the protected Grid Portal 
was built first on the lab machines used by the 
Glasgow MSc students, then deployed to 
production machines. For hosting the Web 
Portal and the Shibboleth Service Provider 
software, a platform of Fedora Core 1 was 
chosen. This OS kernel is compatible with 
GT3.3. The Shibboleth Identity Provider was 
deployed using Fedora Core 4. This choice of 
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operating system was made to facilitate easy 
implementation of OpenLDAP, which requires 
the latest version (2.2.26) for the PERMIS DIS 
to work. Also, the versions of Apache Web 
Server, PHP and mod_auth_ldap are compatible 
with the DIS requirements.  
The connecting of Shibboleth to GridSphere 
can be done in several ways. Ideally, we would 
like Shibboleth to protect the directories that 
GridSphere uses for its dynamically created 
portal pages. Since Shibboleth is an Apache 
module, and GridSphere is deployed in a 
Tomcat container, the use of a connector such 
as mod_jk2 was a desirable (yet potentially 
fraught) solution. It turned out that the 
implementation of the Apache/Tomcat 
connector was quite straightforward. Shibboleth 
was configured using the Location tag in 
httpd.conf to protect the /gridsphere directory 
that GridSphere writes its pages to. Appropriate 
firewall changes were made so that Shibboleth 
was the only way to access the portal, as 
without it, it is easy to point directly to port 
8080 and find the portal front page. 
Shibboleth provides user information 
through HTTP headers. Since GridSphere uses 
its own login system, we needed some way to 
turn off this generic login and use the user 
information that Shibboleth provides. The login 
portal for GridSphere was switched off, and a 
small PHP script was used to parse the HTTP 
headers for Shibboleth information. In order to 
be compatible with PERMIS, a new schema was 
defined that passes the attributes 
“attributeCertificateAttribute” (the signed AC), 
and “permisRole” which is just a text version of 
the unsigned role and was used for test 
purposes. The user’s name was passed to the 
portal as well to provide a personalised login, 
although bearing in mind the Shibboleth trust 
model, releasing user’s identities is 
fundamentally optional, and perhaps 
undesirable in a highly secure system. 
GridSphere now holds the role of the user 
currently logged in. It is this role that is 
presented to the PERMIS API (operating in 
push mode) when making the access decision. 
But in our example, Gridsphere only shows the 
services they is allowed to use according to the 
site policy, so it would be impossible for them 
to even attempt to invoke a service they are not 
authorised to. 
Figure 3 shows the GUI and the Shibboleth 
attributes that have been returned. Here we 
retrieve the distinguished name of the user and 
the attributes indicating which role(s) the person 
has in this federation. These attributes are 
dynamically retrieved by the Shibboleth 
infrastructure and used by the local security 
infrastructure to allow or deny access to the 
resources, i.e. the Grid service portlet. 
Figure 3: A Shibboleth-Protected 
GridSphere portal displaying the user 
attributes received by the Identity 
Provider 
This infrastructure has successfully 
demonstrated how dynamic delegation and 
recognition of attribute certificates can be 
achieved. The design of the next Grid 
Computing module main programming 
assignment is currently under development. The 
scenario we are expecting the students to 
support will be based upon inter-institutional 
resources at Edinburgh and Glasgow and 
associated security policies (utilising the 
delegation issuing service) at Glasgow and 
Edinburgh. In detail, we expect to ask the 
Glasgow students to develop a Grid service that 
can utilise the Condor pools at Glasgow and 
Edinburgh, but that the priority of their jobs at 
Edinburgh will be lower than their job priority 
at Glasgow, due to their external role at 
Edinburgh having a lower privilege. The 
application / Grid service itself may well be 
based upon getting the students to crack a 40-bit 
Data Encryption Standards (DES) key. Whilst it 
is not our intention to educate students to 
misuse Grid resources for key cracking, we 
think that the security flavour of this problem is 
in suited to the general project of Grid security 
which we have been exploring in DyVOSE. 
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6. Conclusions and Future Work 
The scenarios implemented thus far in 
DyVOSE and extended as part of the ESP-Grid 
project have illustrated how a simple GT3.3 
service deployed in the GridSphere portal can 
be protected by the Shibboleth infrastructure 
with fine grained authorisation access control 
performed by the PERMIS software. This 
GT3.3 service uses the Condor Pool for its job 
submission, and does not rely on proxy 
certificates for propagating jobs on the Grid. 
Further work for ESP-Grid will integrate a 
proxy certificate solution using MyProxy, which 
should allow job submission to large scale 
resources where user identity and proxy 
certificates ala classic Grid security solutions 
can also be supported. The use of eduPerson 
standard attributes for Shibboleth will be 
investigated, as we have tailored our own 
attribute set for the work described above. 
The PERMIS dynamic issuing service has 
allowed us to implement a simple dynamic 
delegation PMI between Edinburgh and 
Glasgow on this Grid Service. This service was 
deployed in a GridSphere portal and, using the 
Apache JK2 connector, was protected by the 
Shibboleth Apache module. Shibboleth provides 
user attributes to the PERMIS software when a 
service is invoked, doing away with any access 
control lists on the resource side.  
Thus we have demonstrated that Shibboleth 
can be utilised in a grid context, and that simple 
dynamic delegation can be achieved between 
two sites in a VO. This model where fine 
grained security infrastructures can be 
seamlessly linked has numerous application 
areas where the existing weaker authentication-
based security models is not suited, e.g. the e-
Health and commercial domains. 
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